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In 1976 the United States Supreme Court held in Nebraska Press
Association v. Stuart' that a "gag order" prohibiting members of the
press from publishing information revealed at a criminal pretrial
hearing was unconstitutional under the first amendment. 2 Ever since
that decision, members of the bench and bar have striven to find an
alternative to such a prior restraint which will provide criminal defendants with an unbiased jury without violating the first amendment. In heavily publicized criminal cases, the defense or the prosecution occasionally will request that a judicial proceeding be closed to
the press in order to avoid any unnecessary publicity which may
prejudice the jury against the defendant. A motion to close the court
requires the trial court to strike a delicate balance. On the one hand,
the defendant seeks to protect his sixth amendment guarantee of a fair
trial by an impartial jury. 3 On the other hand, the press and public
wish to exercise their right to attend proceedings of public interest.
This right of access is guaranteed by the first amendment. 4 While
closure furthers the defendant's interest in protecting his sixth amendment right to a fair trial, it runs squarely into the first amendment rights of the press and public. A trial court seldom is presented
with a more direct conflict between constitutional rights.
In

two companion

cases,

State v.

Williams and State v.

Koedatich,5 the New Jersey Supreme Court enunciated guidelines for
New Jersey courts to follow when evaluating closure applications. The
decision in Williams and Koedatich is significant because of its unique
approach to the closure issue. The court based its holding on both

427 U.S. 539 (1976).
Id. at 570. The Court noted that "once a public hearing has been held, what transpired
there could not be subject to prior restraint." Id. at 568.
' U.S. CONST. amend. VI states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

Id.
. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).

- 93 N.J. 39, 459 A.2d 641 (1983).
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federal and state constitutional grounds, and extended the right of
access at criminal proceedings to include pretrial hearings." Additionally, the court adopted a standard of proof for closure applications
which never had been enunciated by the United States Supreme
Court.

7

The defendants in Williams and Koedatich were both charged
with murder, a capital offense in New Jersey, 8 and both cases generated a substantial amount of publicity throughout the defendants'
respective communities. In Williams, the defendant's court-appointed
attorney asked the court to close the defendant's bail hearing. 9 Representatives of the local press intervened and asked to be heard on the
closure application.' 0 After a hearing had been held, the trial court
denied the defendant's motion. 1 The defendant subsequently was
denied leave to appeal to the Appellate Division of the Superior
Court, and applied to the New Jersey Supreme Court for emergency
relief.1 2 The state supreme court granted the defendant leave to appeal and ordered that the bail hearing be held in camera and that the
transcripts be impounded pending a more thorough analysis of the
issues presented.

1 3

In Koedatich the defendant moved that the court close his probable cause hearing.14 Various members of the press contested the motion, and the court ultimately denied the defendant's application.' 5
During the pendency of the defendant's motion for leave to appeal to
the appellate division, the supreme court directly certified the case for
its consideration, and allowed the hearing to be closed until it ren6
dered its opinion in the two companion cases.1
The ultimate decision of the court was that the first amendment
right of access applied to pretrial hearings as well as to trials.' 7 While

Id. at 59, 459 A.2d at 651.
Id. at 69 n.17, 459 A.2d at 657 n.17.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 provides that under certain circumstances a person guilty of
homicide may be sentenced to the death penalty.
Williams, 93 N.J. at 48, 459 A.2d at 646.
10 Id. at 49, 459 A.2d at 646.
1 Id.
12 Id.
11 Id. The court had originally stayed the bail hearing. After leave to appeal had been
granted, the stay was lifted and the court ordered the hearing to proceed in camera. The
transcript of this hearing was to be sealed until the court decided the case. Id.
14 Id. at 50, 459 A.2d at 646.
15 Id.

Id. at 51, 459 A.2d at 647; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
11 Williams, 93 N.J. at 59, 459 A.2d at 651; see supra text accompanying note 6.
16
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the court recognized that this right of access was not absolute, it found
a presumption that criminal pretrial hearings would be open to the
public. In balancing the constitutional interests at stake, the court
held that a criminal defendant could overcome this presumption only
upon a clear showing that an open hearing would present a "realistic
likelihood of prejudice" to the defendant's fair trial guarantee.8 The
court further held that closure could be ordered only where less
burdensome alternatives would not adequately protect the defendant. "9The court relied on both the state and federal constitutions in
20
adopting its balancing test.
The Williams decision was not the first to deal with the closure
issue; the United States Supreme Court had confronted similar issues
in recent years. In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,2" members of the press
objected, on both first and sixth amendment grounds, to an order
barring themselves and the public from attending a pretrial suppression hearing. The Court held that the sixth amendment "right to a
speedy and public trial" was a right which belonged to the accused,
and not to the public at large.2 2 Thus, the press did not have any right
of access to trials via the sixth amendment. 2 3 The majority felt that
prejudicial pretrial publicity could result in irreparable damage to a
defendant's right to an impartial jury, and that closure was the most
effective means of avoiding this problem. 24 Without deciding whether
the first amendment guaranteed a right of access to the defendant's
suppression hearing, the majority concluded that even if such a right
did exist, the trial court had properly balanced it against the defen25
dant's guarantee of an impartial jury.
Williams, 93 N.J. at 63, 459 A.2d at 653-54.
21

Id., 459 A.2d at 654.
Id. at 70 n.17, 459 A.2d at 654 n.17. -[T]he balancing test here prescribed is one that

conforms to our own State Constitution and, we believe, is fully compatible with the First
Amendment." Id.
21 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
22 Id. at 381 (emphasis added in text).
23 Id. at 387. The Court reviewed the history of public trials at common law and found that
there was a presumption in favor of open judicial proceedings embodied within the sixth
amendment, stating that "[t]here is no question that the Sixth Amendment permits and even
presumes open trials as a norm." Id. at 385. The Court concluded, however, that public trials
were not required by the sixth amendment. It further added that even if a right of access were
contained in the sixth amendment, it did not embrace pretrial hearings. Relying upon "substantial evidence," the Court indicated that the public had no right to attend pretrial proceedings at
common law. Id. at 387.
24 Id. at 378-79.
25 Id. at 392. "For even assuming, arguendo, that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
may guarantee such access in some situations, a question we do not decide, this putative right
was given all appropriate deference by the state nisi prius court in the present case." Id.
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Chief Justice Burger, who joined the majority opinion, wrote
separately to emphasize that the Court's decision only applied to
pretrial hearings, and not to trials. The Chief Justice recognized the
important public interest in open trials, but found no such interest for
pretrial proceedings. 26 He believed that open pretrial hearings pre27
sented a grave threat to a criminal defendant's fair trial guarantee.
Justice Powell joined the majority opinion but also wrote separately.2

8

He believed that both the public and the press enjoyed a first

amendment right of access to attend the defendant's hearing, but that
such a right was not absolute.29 He found that the trial court had
correctly balanced the competing interests in allowing the hearing to
be closed. 30 Justice Rehnquist, also concurring, 3' stated that he would
have decided the first amendment question which was expressly left
open by the Court. 32 He disagreed with Justice Powell, and argued
that the first amendment did not contain any right of access for the
public or the press. 33 According to Justice Rehnquist, the closure issue
was not of a constitutional dimension, and was a matter better left to
34
the sound discretion of the trial court.
The dissent in Gannett took the position that the sixth amendment guaranteed an open and public trial. 35 Justice Blackmun, writ-

21

Id. at 394 (Burger, C.J., concurring).

27 Id. at 396 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
21 Id. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring).
29 Id. at 397-98 (Powell, J., concurring). "It is limited both by the constitutional right of
defendants to a fair trial, and by the needs of government to obtain just convictions and to
preserve the confidentiality of sensitive information and the identity of informants." Id. at 398
(citation omitted).
30 Id. at 403 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell stated that the press should be given an
opportunity to be heard on any motion to close the court. "At this hearing, it is the defendant's
responsibility as the moving party to make some showing that the fairness of his trial likely will
be prejudiced by public access to the proceedings." Id. at 401. The press would then have the
opportunity to show that alternatives other than closure would adequately safeguard the defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. He found, as the majority had, that the lower court had followed
these procedures and concluded that the granting of closure was not error. Id. at 403 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
31 Id. at 403 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
32 Id. at 404 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); see supra note 25.
11 Gannett, 443 U.S. at 405 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). "[T]his Court emphatically has
rejected the proposition advanced in Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opinion . . . that the First
Amendment is some sort of constitutional- 'sunshine law' that requires notice, an opportunity to
be heard, and substantial reasons before a governmental proceeding may be closed to the public
and press." Id.
34 Id. at 406 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
35 Id. at 432-33 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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ing for the dissent, analyzed the history 36 and function 37 of open trials
at common law and found that the sixth amendment embodied the
same concerns.3 8 He concluded that the sixth amendment's guarantee
of a "public trial" favored an open proceeding. 39 The dissent further
found that a suppression hearing was within the ambit of the sixth
amendment's public trial guarantee because it was the "close equivalent" of a trial. 40 Thus, the dissent concluded that suppression hearings should also be open to the public and press. 41 Justice Blackmun
noted, however, that this presumption might be overridden where a
criminal defendant could show that closure presented a "substantial
probability" of jury bias. 42 The dissent did not address whether the
43
first amendment, as opposed to the sixth, prohibited closure.
The subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia44 manifested a doctrinal shift in the
Court's approach to the closure issue. In Richmond Newspapers, the
Court reversed a state court's decision to close a criminal defendant's
trial. 45 Relying on the historical basis for open criminal trials 46 as well
as on their functional value, 4 7 Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion

3 Id. at 418-27 (Blackmun,
37 Id. at 427-32 (Blackmun,
38 Id. at 427 (Blackmun, J.,
31 Id. at 439 (Blackmun, J.,

J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
10 Id. at 436 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
41 Id.
41 Id. at 440 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). To meet this burden,
the
defendant would have to show as a "substantial probability" that his fair trial right would suffer
"irreparable damage," that any alternatives to closure would be inadequate, and that closure
would be effective. Id. at 441-42 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
43 Id. at 447 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). "To the extent the
Constitution protects a right of public access to the proceeding, the standards enunciated under
the Sixth Amendment suffice to protect that right. I therefore need not reach the issue of First
Amendment access." Id.
" 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
41 Id. at 581.
11 Id. at 564-69. Chief Justice Burger, the author of the plurality opinion, first outlined the
historical development of open trials from the common law and concluded that "the historical
evidence demonstrates conclusively that at the time when our organic laws were adopted,
criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open." Id. at 569.
11 Id. at 569-73. The Chief Justice emphasized the "therapeutic value" of open trials. Id. at
569. Open criminal trials increased public awareness of the system, discouraged vigilantes, and
enhanced public scrutiny. Id. at 570-73. The plurality went on to note the importance of the
media as "surrogates for the public" in this educative role. Id. at 573; see also Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) ("A responsible press has always been regarded as the
handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field . . . . The press
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held that the first amendment implicitly guaranteed to the public and
the press a right to attend criminal trials. 48 As the lower court had
failed to consider a less burdensome alternative to closure, the Supreme Court held that closure was improper. 4 Although there was no
majority opinion in Richmond Newspapers, seven members of the
of access to
Court 0 agreed that there was a first amendment right
2
criminal trials,' but that this right was not absolute.
The Court's historical and functional approach to the closure
issue was given a new dimension in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court.53 In Globe Newspaper, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court had interpreted a state statute to require mandatory closure in
sex offense trials during the testimony of minor victims. 54 In finding
the Massachusetts statute unconstitutional, Justice Brennan's majority
opinion reiterated the two features of the first amendment right of
55
access: the long history of open trials, and their functional value.
The majority noted that the right of access was not absolute, but
indicated its preference for open trials by holding that closure would
be justified only by a "compelling governmental interest. . . narrowly
tailored to serve that interest." 56 The Court found that the state's
asserted interest in protecting minors from trauma and embarrassment was indeed compelling, but that nevertheless, mandatory clo-

does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by
subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.").
4' Richmond Newspapers, 484 U.S. at 580. The plurality relied on the first amendment
freedoms of speech, press, and assembly. Id. at 577.
41 Id. at 580-81.
50 Justice Powell did not participate in the decision and Justice Rehnquist dissented, believing
that nothing in the Constitution prohibited a state from closing a criminal trial. Id. at 606
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 580 (Burger, C.J., joined by White and Stevens); id. at 585 (Brennan, J., concurI5
ring, joined by Marshall); id. at 599 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 604 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
5' Id. at 581 n.18 (Burger, C.J., joined by White and Stevens); id. at 588 (Brennan, J.,
concurring, joined by Marshall); id. at 600 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 603-04 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
53 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
Id. at 601-02. Prior to trial, the defendant had objected to closure of the trial. Id. at 599.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court interpreted the state statute to require mandatory
closure during testimony by minors notwithstanding the fact that the defendant opposed closure.
Id. at 601-02.
15 Id. at. 605-06.
51 Id. at 606-07.
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sure was impermissible. 57 Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment of the Court, yet wrote separately to emphasize her belief that
58
the right of access applied only to criminal trials.
Chief Justice Burger, the author of the plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers, dissented. 59 He disagreed with the majority's
broad interpretation of Richmond Newspapers, and noted the absence
of any historical basis for open testimony by minor victims of sex
crimes. 60 The dissent believed that, because the interests of the state
62
were compelling, 6 ' the Richmond Newspapers test had been met,
and a minimal impact upon first amendment rights was reasonable
under the circumstances.

63

While the Supreme Court was deciding the extent of the right of
access to judicial proceedings, the New Jersey courts were struggling
with the same issue. In State v. Allen,6 4 the New Jersey Supreme
Court reviewed a trial court's order prohibiting the publication of
inadmissible testimony obtained during evidentiary hearings.6 5 The
New Jersey Supreme Court, relying upon Nebraska Press Association
v. Stuart,6 held these orders unconstitutional because the press had an
absolute right to report on testimony offered in open court.6 7 Recognizing that the defendants' rights to fair trials were at stake, the court
suggested alternatives to the use of "gag orders.

'68

One alternative

57 Id. at 607-08.

In short, [the statute] cannot be viewed as a narrowly tailored means of accomodating [sic] the State's asserted interest: That interest could be served just as well by
requiring the trial court to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the State's
legitimate concern for the well-being of the minor victim necessitates closure. Such
an approach ensures that the constitutional right of the press and public to gain
access to criminal trials will not be restricted except where necessary to protect the
State's interest.
Id. at 609.
58 Id. at 611 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
51 Id. at 612 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). He was joined by Justice Rehnquist, the only
dissenter in Richmond Newspapers. See supra note 50.
o Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 614 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573).
61 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
12 Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 616 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 619-20 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
64 73 N.J. 132, 373 A.2d 377 (1977).
15 Id. at 135, 373 A.2d at 378.
11 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
67 Allen, 73 N.J. at 140, 373 A.2d at 380; see supra note 2.
66 Allen, 73 N.J. at 141-42, 373 A.2d at 381-82. Among the alternatives listed were: sequestration of the jury, clear jury instructions, and the use of in camera proceedings. Id.
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suggested was to hold the hearings in camera upon the defendants'
consent.6 9 The court noted that such a procedure might be subject to
constitutional infirmities, and stated in dicta that even if it were
permissible, it would have to be used with caution. 70 The court advised that closure would be proper only when less burdensome alternatives were unavailable and only upon a "clear showing of a serious
7
and imminent threat to the integrity of the trial." '
Justice Pashman's concurring opinion noted that in camera proceedings were suspect. 72 Although the constitutionality of closure had
not yet been determined by the United States Supreme Court, Justice
Pashman emphasized that both historical and first amendment considerations were implicated in any decision to close a trial. 73 Justice
Schreiber also concurred, defending the constitutionality of in camera
proceedings.7 4 He concluded that in camera proceedings were a permissible means of safeguarding a criminal defendant's sixth amend75
ment rights.
The closure alternative suggested in Allen was not followed by
the lower courts in New Jersey. In State v. Joyce76 the defendants
moved that the trial court exclude the press from a pretrial hearing in
"IId. at 142, 373 A.2d at 382. The defendant's consent would be necessary in order to
safeguard his sixth amendment right to a public trial. See supra text accompanying note 22.
10 Allen, 73 N.J. at 143-45, 373 A.2d at 382-83.
Against this course must be balanced the concept that court proceedings should be
subject to public scrutiny and that the public has a right to expect that criminal trials
will be conducted in open court .. . . Ithas been suggested that this may be a
constitutional requirement.
From the standpoint of the press, the in camera procedure, while not a direct
restraint, arguably achieves the same result by more subtle means and becomes in
effect a prior restraint on the news-gathering ability of the press.
Id. at 144, 373 A.2d at 382-83 (citations omitted).
71 Id. at 145, 373 A.2d at 383. The court also stated that where a defendant's fair trial
guarantee was likely to be threatened by prejudicial publicity, the trial court could utilize other
alternatives to closure. Id.
In such circumstances, the trial court has available additional means such as (a)
adjournment of the trial to allow public attention to subside, (b) change of venue, (c)
foreign jury, (d) searching questioning of prospective jurors to screen out those
infected by pretrial publicity and, (e) emphatic and clear instructions to the jury to
decide the issues only on evidence presented in open court.
Id.
72 Id. at 166-68, 373 A.2d at 393-95 (Pashman, J.,
concurring).
73 Id. at 167, 373 A.2d at 394 (Pashman, J., concurring). Interestingly, Justice Pashman's
approach was similar to that later employed by the Supreme Court in Richmond Newspapers.
See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
71 Allen, 73 N.J. at 170, 373 A.2d at 395 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
75 Id. at 178, 373 A.2d at 400 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
76 160 N.J. Super. 419, 390 A.2d 151 (Law Div. 1978), aff'd sub nom. State v. De Bellis, 174
N.J. Super. 195, 413 A.2d 986 (App. Div. 1980).
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order to protect their right to a trial by an impartial jury.77 The court
denied the defendants' motion, noting that it had other alternatives to
consider prior to trial when the jury had not been empanelled. 78
Questioning the constitutionality of closure, the trial judge decided to
allow the defendants a more extensive voir dire. 79 The trial court
believed that the defendants' assertion of prejudice was speculative,
while the first amendment implications were definite and concrete. 80
In State v. Hannah,81 the trial court had ordered that all pretrial
hearings be held in camera in order to avoid any prejudicial publicity
before trial. 82 The appellate division reversed the closure order because the trial court had not offered any factual basis for such an
order. 83 Based upon the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale84 and the New Jersey Supreme Court's
suggestion in State v. Allen, 85 the court found that three conditions
must be met in order to justify closure: a threat of prejudice, the
absence of other, less intrusive alternatives, and a narrowly drawn
closure order.8 6 The court concluded that none of these conditions had
87
been met.
Id. at 423, 390 A.2d at 152.
Id. at 424, 390 A.2d at 153.
79 Id. at 426, 390 A.2d at 154. The trial court felt that under such circumstances closure
would be unnecessary unless all other alternatives were unavailable. Id.
80 Id. at 428, 390 A.2d at 155. The speculative nature of the defendant's claim was demonstrated by a Postscript added to the trial court's opinion:
POSTSCRIPT: This opinion was completed after the jury was selected. It is interesting to note that what at the outset appeared as an explosive confrontation between
the First and Sixth Amendment rights, when put to the acid test of reality, fizzled
like a pricked balloon. Of the 102 prospective jurors voir dired only three read or
heard anything about the case, even though the newspapers and radio stations
carried almost daily reports of the [pretrial] hearing which lasted six days, and
several of the newspaper accounts bore what some would term sensational headlines.
Id. at 430, 390 A.2d at 156.
81 171 N.J. Super. 325, 408 A.2d 1349 (App. Div. 1979).
IId. at 327, 408 A.2d at 1350.
83 Id. at 330, 408 A.2d at 1352.
84 443 U.S. 368 (1979); see supra notes 21-43 and accompanying text.
85 73 N.J. 132, 373 A.2d 377 (1977); see supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
86 Hannah, 171 N.J. Super. at 331-32, 408 A.2d at 1352.
(1) There must be a "clear showing of a serious and imminent threat to the
integrity of the trial.". . . Mr. Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in Gannett
v. DePasquale,. . . stated that a defendant seeking closure must "make some showing that the fairness of his trial will likely be prejudiced by public access to the
proceedings."
(2) The court must first consider all available alternatives and conclude they are
not feasible or proper under the circumstances.
(3) The order of closure should be no more extensive than the circumstances
fairly require.
Id.(citations omitted).
87 Id. at 332, 408 A.2d at 1352-53.
77
78
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This evolving body of state and federal law persuaded the New
Jersey Supreme Court to address the closure issue directly in State v.
Williams.88 In Williams, the court tried to strike the proper balance
between the first amendment right of access and the sixth amendment
guarantee of an impartial jury. The court was confronted with a
question which had not been decided in any of the previous casesspecifically, whether the first amendment right of access applied to
pretrial hearings.8 9 A further problem was presented in that no clearly
defined standards existed for the courts to apply in reviewing closure
applications. 0 The court resolved both matters in an authoritative
manner, relying upon both the state and federal constitutions for its
decision.
Justice Handler, writing for the majority, noted that there recently had been "major developments" in the law regarding closure of
the courts. 9 ' The Williams majority acknowledged that the United
States Supreme Court had never extended the first amendment right
of access to pretrial hearings. 92 Utilizing the Supreme Court's historical and functional approach to closure, the majority concluded that
such an extension was logical.9 3 The court pointed to the increased
importance of pretrial proceedings in the modern criminal process
and concluded that open hearings furthered important "institutional
values. '94 The court also relied on the "unbroken tradition" of con-

88 93 N.J. 39, 459 A.2d 641 (1983).
8 See supra text accompanying note 25.
o See Williams, 93 N.J. at 69-70 n.17, 459 A.2d at 657 n.17; see also infra notes 172-74 and
accompanying text.
91 Williams, 93 N.J. at 47, 459 A.2d at 645.
92 Id. at 51-52, 459 A.2d at 647.
93 Id. at 58, 459 A.2d at 651.
4 Id. at 54, 459 A.2d at 648.
Conducting pretrial criminal proceedings in an atmosphere of secrecy is offensive to
the general public and undermines the public trust essential to an effective judicial
system .. . .In addition to kindling public misperception and eroding public confidence, closure of significant pretrial proceedings perpetuates general ignorance and
cuts off public knowledge necessary to a full understanding of the criminal justice
system . . . .Conversely, the openness of pretrial hearings in criminal cases fosters
an informed public "discussion of governmental affairs." . .. Open proceedings
contribute to the public's knowledge and encourage a general appreciation of the
administration of criminal justice.
Id. at 54-55, 459 A.2d at 648-49 (citations omitted).
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ducting such hearings in open court.9 5
The majority, however, did not confine its analysis of the right of
access to the Federal Constitution. Justice Handler found the state
constitution to be an alternative basis for such a right at the pretrial
stages. 6 The court recognized that the United States Supreme Court
cases finding a right of access under the Federal Constitution had
dealt only with trials.9" The Williams majority found that article 1,
paragraph 6 of the state constitution 98 embodied the same analytical
principles regarding a right of access as did the first amendment. 9 9
The majority concluded once again that both history and logic dictate
that the state constitutional right of access embraces pretrial hearings. 100

The majority recognized that the right of the public and of the
press to attend criminal proceedings did not "exist in a vacuum" and
therefore had to be balanced against a defendant's right to a fair trial
and an impartial jury.' 0 The court emphasized that the defendant's
02
right was essential under both the federal and state constitutions.

95 Id. at 55, 459 A.2d at 649. The majority conceded that the history of openness for pretrial
proceedings was not "centuries old." Id. Nevertheless, the majority concluded that pretrial
proceedings historically were open to the public and the press. Id. "The near uniform practice in
the federal and state court systems has been to conduct pretrial criminal proceedings in open
court." Id.
Il Id. at 57, 459 A.2d at 650. "In the absence of a definitive Supreme Court determination on
this question, we consider the State Constitution as an alternative basis for the public's right of
access to the pretrial stages of a criminal prosecution." Id. (footnote omitted).
o7 Id. 'Although we firmly believe that the federal constitutional right of access extends to
criminal pretrial proceedings, we acknowledge that the Supreme Court in Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper carefully confined its decisions to the criminal trial itself." Id.
98 N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 6 provides in pertinent part: "No law shall be passed to restrain
or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." Id.
99 Williams, 93 N.J. at 58, 459 A.2d at 651. The majority found it unnecessary, however, to
decide whether the state constitutional right was more extensive than the right recognized under
the Federal Constitution.
In defining the basis and character of this significant state constitutional right, we
need not decide whether the provisions of the State Constitution require more
extended protection of expressional freedoms in this context than the First Amendment as we have interpreted it under the guidance of the Richmond Newspapers and
Globe Newspaper decisions.
Id. at 58-59, 459 A.2d at 651.
100 Id. at 59, 459 A.2d at 651.
101Id.
102 Id. at 60-61, 459 A.2d at 652. Compare Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (sixth
amendment guarantee to impartial jury is essential to fair trial) with State v. Jackson, 43 N.J.
148, 157-58, 203 A.2d 1, 6 (1964) (triers of fact must be " 'as nearly impartial' 'as the lot of
humanity will admit' "), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 982 (1965).
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Emphasis also was placed on the requirement of impartiality in capital cases. 10 3 Thus, the majority concluded that the court's role was to
ease this "tension" between the conflicting constitutional guarantees
of fairness and access by enunciating a standard for the courts to
apply. 10 4 The majority found, however, that the judiciary's duty to
provide impartial juries'0 usually could be satisfied without resorting
to closure.
The Williams majority concluded that all hearings presumptively
were open to the public and to the press.10 6 In order to protect the
defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury, a balancing test
was established for the New Jersey courts to utilize in ruling on all
pretrial closure applications. To overcome the presumption of openness, a defendant must show clearly that pretrial publicity presents a
"realistic likelihood of prejudice."107 Once the defendant meets this
burden, the trial court then must determine whether closure is the
only alternative which adequately will protect the defendant's
rights. 0 8 The defendant' 0 9 thus would have to produce sufficient evidence to show that extensive publicity might influence jurors in their
decisions." 0 The court asserted that the defendant was in the best
position to produce such evidence because he would be most aware of
such publicity and its adverse impact."'
In assessing the likelihood of jury bias, the courts were directed to
consider all of the surrounding circumstances, including the probable

103Williams, 93 N.J. at 61, 459 A.2d at 652. "The death penalty is a categorical imperative
for trial fairness." Id.
10 Id. at 62, 459 A.2d at 653. The court was aware of the need for a definitive standard.
We must determine the standards to be applied by trial courts in balancing, on the
one hand, the constitutional right of public access to criminal pretrial proceedings
and, on the other, the constitutional right of a defendant to a fair trial before
impartial jurors. We consider the key to the solution of this difficult and delicate
problem to be the central role of the court itself in ensuring the integrity of the
judicial process, which includes the proper accommodation of these contesting constitutional interests.

Id.
105Id. at 63, 459 A.2d at 653.
106 Id.
1IId., 459 A.2d at 653-54.
108Id.
10 Id. at 64, 459 A.2d at 654. In a footnote the court noted that a prosecutor or even the court
might seek closure under appropriate circumstances. Id. at 64 n.8, 459 A.2d at 654 n.8.
110 Id. at 64, 459 A.2d at 654. A defendant would have to produce evidence of extensive
prejudicial publicity prior to the hearing which, accompanied by the anticipated publicity for
the hearing, would be likely to "create bias in the minds of potential jurors." Id.
II Id.
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scope and impact of any adverse publicity." 2 The majority emphasized that the issues and evidence to be presented in the proceeding for
which closure is sought would be particularly significant in assessing
the likelihood of prejudice. 1 3 The court further noted that the dangers
of juror bias were especially acute in capital cases because a bifurcated
trial presents possibilities of prejudice to two different juries." 4 If it is
determined that pretrial publicity will be both extensive and prejudicial to the defendant, the trial court then must determine whether any
other alternatives are feasible." 5 The alternatives suggested by the
6
majority were: larger pools of potential jurors;1 changes of venue;"17
5
more extensive voir dires;" and cautionary instructions to jurors.19
In order to ensure fairness and uniform application of the court's
balancing test, certain procedures were to be observed by the trial
courts. 20 Members of the press were to be given notice and an oppor-

12Id.
I3 at 64-65, 459 A.2d at 654.
id.
d. at 65, 459 A.2d at 654-55. Under New Jersey's homicide statute, the issues of guilt and
punishment are tried separately. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:ll-3(c)(1)(West 1982). Thus, it is
possible that two different juries will decide different aspects of the case. Williams, 93 N.J. at 65
n.9, 459 A.2d at 654-55 n.9.
Is Williams, 93 N.J. at 66, 459 A.2d at 655.
116Id. at 67, 459 A.2d at 655. "The court should explore the feasibility of augmenting the pool
of eligible jurors in the vicinage, and should consider the practicability of using citizens from
beyond the particular vicinage to serve as potential jurors, the use of so-called 'foreign jurors.' "
Id. at 67, 459 A.2d at 655 (footnote omitted). The court noted that the use of foreign jurors
might in certain cases implicate a defendant's right to be tried by a jury of his peers. Id. at 67
n.12, 459 A.2d at 655-56 n.12. Additional problems presented were that the New Jersey Court
Rules permitted only an assignment judge to appoint foreign jurors, R. 3:14-2, and that a
defendant's peremptory challenges were reduced from 20 to five when foreign juries were used,
R. 1:8-3(d). In order to encourage the use of foreign jurors as an alternative to closure, the
Williams majority suspended those rules. Williams, 93 N.J. at 67 n.12, 459 A.2d at 655 n.12.
117 Williams, 93 N.J. at 67 & n.13, 459 A.2d at 655-56 & n.13. The court noted that changes
of venue were difficult to obtain because of the court's holding in State v. Wise, 19 N.J. 59, 115
A.2d 62 (1955), which held that clear and convincing proof of juror bias was required in order to
grant a change of venue. The court overruled this decision in order to allow a change of venue
where the trial judge concluded that it was necessary to avoid a realistic likelihood of prejudice.
Williams, 93 N.J. at 67-68 n.13, 459 A.2d at 656 n.13.
118Id. at 68-69, 459 A.2d at 656. The court noted that trial judges should give special
attention to the proposed questions of attorneys on voir dire. Id. The trial court would also be
allowed to excuse jurors for cause more willingly in favor of the defendant, especially in capital
cases. Id.
'IQ Id. at 69, 459 A.2d at 656. The court noted that the use of cautionary instructions as an
effective means of eliminating jury bias was subject to some debate. Id. at 68-69 n. 16, 459 A.2d
at 656 n.16.
120 Id. at 71-73, 451 A.2d at 657-59. The court made it clear that its opinion did not intend to
resolve every contingency which might arise in a closure application. It therefore ordered that
the procedure followed for closure applications would be a continuing course of study by the
4
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tunity to be heard on all closure applications.' 2' The trial court, in its
discretion, would be permitted to close sensitive portions of the closure
hearing in order to protect the defendant's rights. 122 Finally, the trial
court would be compelled to disclose its findings in order to facilitate
appellate review. 23 The Williams majority noted that in the cases
before the court, closure of the two hearings had been allowed pending the court's ultimate decision. 124 In light of its decision, the court
vacated its earlier orders and decided that the impounded transcripts
25
should be made available to the public and to the press. 1
Justice Schreiber was the lone dissenter in Williams. 126 He disagreed with the balancing test enunciated by Justice Handler and
argued that the majority had not given proper weight to the defendant's interest in a fair trial.127 Justice Schreiber's interpretation of the
closure cases decided by the United States Supreme Court was vastly
different from that of the Williams majority. Justice Schreiber viewed
Globe Newspaper as a very narrow decision because the defendant in
Globe Newspaper actually had opposed closure. 28 He asserted that
Globe Newspaper merely was concerned with a state statutory policy
and not with the defendant's sixth amendment guarantee of a fair trial
by an impartial jury. 29 Justice Schreiber, relying upon Justice Ste-

Supreme Court's Committee on the Criminal Rules of Procedure and the Committee of Judges
on Capital Causes. Id. at 71 & n.18, 459 A.2d at 657-58 & n.18.
121 Id. at 72-73, 459 A.2d at 658. The parties allowed to participate on the closure application
would be determined by the court in its sole discretion. Id. at 72, 459 A.2d at 658: see also United
States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 557-60 (3d Cir. 1982). "[S]ome notice must be given that is
calculated to inform the public that its constitutional rights may be implicated in a particular
criminal proceeding." Id. at 559. The Third Circuit resolved the notice issue by requiring the
district court to enter motions for closure on the case docket "sufficiently in advance of any
hearing" so as to provide members of the public and of the press an opportunity to present any
objections to closure. Id.
122 Williams, 93 N.J. at 73, 459 A.2d at 659. The court noted that closing the closure hearing
would not be a commonplace event. "By this direction, we intend no more than to emphasize the
discretionary authority of the trial judge to ensure that the potentially prejudical material is not
prematurely revealed before the meritorious issue itself can be resolved." Id. (citing Globe
Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 609 n.25).
123 Id. at 73, 459 A.2d at 659. The court emphasized that this is extremely important when
judicial notice is taken or the court relies on its own expertise. Id.
124 See supra notes 13, 16 and accompanying text.
125 Williams, 93 N.J. at 74, 459 A.2d at 659.
126Id. (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
127 Id. Justice Schreiber felt that the majority should have been more sensitive to the rights of
defendants in capital cases. Id.
128 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
121 Williams, 93 N.J. at 76, 459 A.2d at 660 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
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wart's opinion in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, argued that a defendant only need show a "reasonable probability of prejudice" to justify
closure. 130
Justice Schreiber objected to the Williams majority's test for a
number of reasons. He felt that requiring a defendant to show
"clearly" a "realistic likelihood" of prejudice placed an unfair burden
on the defendant. 31 While the majority had stated that the standard
of proof on a closure application was a mere preponderance of the
evidence,' 32 Justice Schreiber argued that the use of the word "clearly"
had the practical effect of changing the defendant's burden to a "clear
and convincing" standard. 133 Justice Schreiber also asserted that the
defendant's burden would be increased substantially if the defendant
were required to prove the inadequacy of every other alternative to
closure. 134 The Justice argued that once the defendant had met his
burden of proof, closure was justified. "35 He insisted that those objecting to closure should logically have the burden of providing an effec1 36
tive alternative.
Finally, Justice Schreiber objected to the majority's use of the
state constitution as an alternative basis for its decision. 137 He argued
that if the first amendment itself guaranteed a right of access to
pretrial hearings, the majority did not need to resort to the state

30 Id. at 76, 459 A.2d at 660 (Schreiber, J., dissenting). Justice Handler had earlier disputed
the contention of Justice Schreiber that Gannett had set any standard for closure and noted that
the "reasonable probablity" test was merely a quotation from the holding of the trial court in
that case. Id. at 69 n.17, 459 A.2d at 657 n.17.
Id. at 77, 459 A.2d at 661 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
I3,
132 Id. at 71 n.17, 459 A.2d at 657 n.17.
,33 Id. at 77, 459 A.2d at 661 (Schreiber, J., dissenting). -'[T]o say that one must be clearly
satisfied that a fact has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence is simply another way of
saying that the evidence must clearly and convincingly produce a firm belief in the existence of
the fact." Id. Justice Schreiber concluded that the majority's contention that the defendant's
burden of proof was a mere preponderance of the evidence, see supra note 132 and accompanying text, was a "distinction without a difference." Williams, 93 N.J. at 77, 459 A.2d at 661
(Schreiber, J., dissenting). He asserted that the majority's use of the word "clearly" would result
in the application of a "clear and convincing" standard by trial courts. Id. at 77-78, 459 A.2d at
661 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
131 Williams, 93 N.J.
at 79, 459 A.2d at 662 (Schreiber, J., dissenting). Justice Schreiber
questioned whether under the majority's standard, the defendant had this burden. Id. at 79 n.4,
459 A.2d at 662 n.4 (Schreiber, J., dissenting). He noted, however, that this burden clearly was
not on the public and the press. Id.
,35 Id. at 79, 459 A.2d at 662 (Schreiber, J., dissenting). He argued that once a "realistic
likelihood of prejudice" had been demonstrated, closure presumptively was valid. Id.
136 Id.
131 Id. at 80, 459 A.2d at 662 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
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constitution at all. 38 If, however, the first amendment did not guarantee such a right, he asserted that the use of the state constitution as
an alternative basis was meaningless. 39 A state constitutional right of
access could not by itself override the minimum protection guaranteed
to all criminal defendants by the sixth amendment. 40 Justice
Schreiber concluded that the balance in such a case would depend on
the weight of the sixth amendment and that this was a determination
4
to be made by the United States Supreme Court, not the states.' '
The significance of the New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion in
Williams lies in its unique approach to the closure issue. As the first
amendment right of access had not been explored fully by the United
States Supreme Court, the Williams majority was compelled to confront two unanswered questions. It first had to determine whether the
right of access was applicable to pretrial proceedings. It also had to
decide the appropriate standard to be applied by the lower courts
when balancing the conflicting interests of the public and the press
against those of criminal defendants. Most importantly, the court had
to determine whether the state constitution independently guaranteed
a pretrial right of access and demanded a particular showing before
closure could be ordered. Ultimately, the state constitution had a
significant impact upon the resolution of these two issues. In fact,
these issues were inextricably entwined with the state constitutional
issue.
The implications of a decision based on state constitutional guarantees are manifest. The United States Supreme Court does not possess
appellate jurisdiction of cases decided upon "adequate and independent" state grounds. 42 The New Jersey Supreme Court decides the

138

Id.

139

Id.

140

Id.
[1]f there is no federal First Amendment right to attend these pretrial proceedings,
the validity of a state constitutional right would depend on the extent and nature of
the defendant's federal Sixth Amendment constitutional right, as explicated and to
be explicated by the Supreme Court. Defining the press' state constitutional right is
of little moment without knowing the pull and impact of the defendant's federal
constitutional right.

Id.
See supra note 140.
28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976) provides appellate jurisdiction for the United States Supreme
Court to review state court decisions. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction, however, when
the state court decision is based upon an interpretation of state law which is sufficient to support
the state court's holding. See Klinger v. Missouri, 80 U.S. 257 (1871); see also Murdock v. City of
Memphis, 87 U.S. 590 (1874). The dual bases for the doctrine of adequate and independent state
141
142
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weight to be given to its state constitutional guarantees, 4 3 and the
United States Supreme Court ultimately assesses the minimum requirements of the Federal Constitution.144 By virtue of the supremacy
clause, anything which falls below the federally guaranteed minimum
is unconstitutional. 45 If the state constitution provides a truly independent basis for a particular decision by a state court, however, the
Supreme Court may not even review the case to correct errors in the
state court's interpretation of the Federal Constitution. 46
In extending the right of access to pretrial proceedings, the Williams majority adopted the analysis which had been employed by the
United States Supreme Court in Richmond Newspapers and Globe
Newspaper. 47 Thus, the Williams court correctly concluded that the
"institutional value" of open pretrial hearings was justified by both
"logic and experience. " 48 While many questions were left unanswered by Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper, it became
clear that the boundaries of this first amendment right of access would
be determined by its historical basis and functional value. The historical and functional components of the right of access will sometimes be
diametrically opposed to one another. At this point, a functional view
of the right of access is necessary to preserve the structural role of the
first amendment, and the functional rather than the historical analysis

grounds are "'[r]espect for the independence of state courts, as well as avoidance of rendering
advisory opinions." Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3475 (1983). See generally Comment,
Developments in the Law- The Interpretationof State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1324, 1331-33 (1982).
143 State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 353 n.2, 346 A.2d 66, 68 n.2 (1975); see also Prune Yard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (each state has "sovereign right to adopt in its
own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal
Constitution"). See generally Brennan, State Constitution and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977).
11 See Comment, supra note 142, at 1333-34.
''
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 provides:
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.; see also Comment, supra note 142, at 1334. "'[S]tate constitutions may always be used to
supplement or expand federally guaranteed constitutional rights, but may never be used to
undermine or infringe them. Federal law sets a minimum floor of rights below which state courts
cannot slip." Id.
'4 Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945).
"' Williams, 93 N.J. at 58, 459 A.2d at 651.
141 Id. at 57, 459 A.2d at 650.
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should determine whether a pretrialproceeding should be open to the
public and the press. 4 9 Historically, criminal pretrial proceedings
have been open to the public and the press, 50 and modern criminal
procedure favors open pretrial hearings.' 5' If the history of open
pretrial proceedings is not as extensive as that of open trials, it is
essentially because many pretrial hearings are relatively modern innovations.1 52 Further, a pretrial right of access does not require any
drastic change in the judicial system. As historical considerations are
an important component of the right of access, 5 3 a pretrial presumption of openness need not apply to proceedings which traditionally
have been closed. The right of access, therefore, would not jeopardize
the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. 54 Further, the right of access
would not apply to proceedings which are not adjudicative because
these proceedings do not enjoy the tradition of openness shared by
most other pretrial proceedings. 55 Functionally, open pretrial pro-

' See United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 555 (1982) ("Richmond Newspapers relies in
part on history to find a first amendment right of access to criminal trials. We do not think that
historical analysis is relevant in determining whether there is a first amendment right of access to
pretrial criminal proceedings"); accord Comment, Free Press-FairTrial: A Proposalto Extend
the Right of Access to Encompass PretrialProceedings, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 524, 535-36 (1983).
This historical and functional approach has introduced both static and dynamic concepts to the
first amendment right of access. The static component of the right of access requires historical
evidence of an open proceeding. Closure would be improper only when a particular proceeding
had traditionally been open to the public and the press. The dynamic component of the right of
access requires a functional analysis of first amendment values. If the goals of the first amendment would be furthered by an open proceeding, then closure would be improper.
1-1 See Fenner & Koley, Access to Judicial Proceedings: To Richmond Newspapers and
Beyond, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 415, 434 (1981); see also Williams, 93 N.J. at 55-56 & n.6,
459 A.2d at 650 & n.6 (Williams majority noted New Jersey courts were particularly steeped in
tradition of openness for pretrial criminal proceedings). But see Gannett, 443 U.S. at 387-91
(majority concluded "[c]losed pretrial proceedings have been a familiar part of the judicial
landscape in this country .. ").
'' See Williams, 93 N.J. at 55 & n.5, 459 A.2d at 649 & n.5 (listing practices of various
federal and state courts).
"I See United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 555 (1982) ("[Tjhere was no counterpart at
common law to the modern suppression hearing."); see also Fenner & Koley, supra note 150, at
434 & n.97 (modern pretrial proceedings traditionally are open to public and are closed only for
"reasons of efficiency rather than secrecy, and because the public has not sought access").
"I Cf. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 52 U.S.L.W. 4113 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1984). PressEnterprisewas decided subsequent to the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Williams. In
Press-Enterprisethe United States Supreme Court found closure of the jury voir dire in a capital
case to be impermissible. The Court relied heavily upon the historical evidence favoring an open
voir dire. Id. at 4114-15. The Court apparently considered the voir dire to be part of the criminal
trial, and thus did not address the application of the historical analysis to pretrial proceedings.
See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
I" See Fenner & Koley, supra note 150, at 434.
15 See id. (pretrial depositions and interrogatories characterized as nonjudicial and no right of
access to such proceedings was necessary until part of public record at judicial proceeding).
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ceedings promote the same goals furthered by open trials. Public
scrutiny guarantees the accountability of the entire criminal process.' 56 Publicity serves as an implicit check on the judicial system,
which is essential to a democratic system of government. 57 Open
hearings promote public trust in the system. 58 When a decision of
enormous public interest is made prior to trial, the public or the press
must be present in order to understand and to evaluate the decision. 5 9
Allowing press coverage of pretrial proceedings also fosters education
of the public at large. 60 With the vastly increased importance of
pretrial proceedings in the modern criminal justice system, the functional value of open pretrial proceedings is equivalent to that of open
trials. 161
The Williams majority's extension of the right of access to the
pretrial stages promotes the dynamic structural objectives of the first
amendment without infringing on those of the sixth amendment.
Assuming that open pretrial hearings do increase the likelihood of
juror bias, this danger may be avoided by resorting to one of the many
alternatives to closure. A defendant's fear of juror bias should be
assuaged by an exhaustive voir dire. 6 2 Obviously, any claim of juror
bias which is made before the jury has been empanelled is speculative
at best, 63 because a realistic appraisal of the effect of any adverse

156

See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569 & n.7 (quoting J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF

524 (1827)); id. at 595 (Brennan, J.,concurring); see also Fenner & Koley,
supra note 150, at 435-36.
151 See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 596 (Brennan, J.,concurring).
'5'"Secrecy is profoundly inimical to this demonstrative purpose of the trial process.- Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 595 (Brennan, J.,concurring); see also Fenner & Koley, supra
note 150, at 435.
5 See Fenner & Koley, supra nute 150, at 435.
11oRichmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572; id. at 587-88 (Brennan, J.,concurring). The press
JUDICIAL EVIDENCE

reports on a variety of matters which most citizens are unable to observe firsthand. Thus,
members of the press function "as surrogates for the public." Id. at 573.
161 See United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 555-57 (1982) ("[T]he same societal interests
and structural arguments that mandated a first amendment right of access to criminal trials in
Richmond Newspapers apply with equal force to pretrial criminal proceedings."); see also
Fenner & Koley, supra note 150, at 435-37.
162See Allen, 73 N.J. at 161, 373 A.2d at 391 (Pashman, J., concurring). See generally Joyce,
160 N.J. Super. at 427, 390 A.2d at 154.
l13See Joyce, 160 N.J. Super. at 428, 390 A.2d at 155.
Before this court could conclude that the presence of the news media during the
[pretrial] hearing will result in prejudice to defendants and violate their Sixth
Amendment rights, the court would have to speculate as to the existence of several
facts: the information which the news media will actually disseminate; that prospective jurors will actually read the information in newspapers or hear it on radio or
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publicity cannot be made until the jurors are examined in open
court. 16

4

At that time, the judge and the parties would be aware of the

scope and character of any publicity, and then could rationally determine its true impact on potential jurors.l15
Although the existence of a pretrial right of access was an open
question at the federal level,' the Williams majority relied heavily on
the state constitution as an alternative basis for its decision."17 The
"logic and experience" of the New Jersey courts were thus integral
factors in the court's decision to extend the right of access to the
pretrial stages. Notwithstanding the court's supposition that the Federal Constitution necessitated a pretrial right of access, the majority
posited that such a right was justified independently by the state
constitution.' 6 8 Thus, the majority's creation of a pretrial right of
access would appear to be insulated from United States Supreme
Court review and protected from the nuances of subsequent decisions
of that Court. 6 9 This, however, is not the case because the Supreme
Court has not indicated the minimum guarantees of the first and sixth
amendments during the pretrial stages. The Court eventually may
indicate that one of these interests deserves greater weight during
pretrial proceedings. The New Jersey Constitution cannot adequately
protect the federally guaranteed minimum until the Supreme Court
has enunciated the extent of these interests during the pretrial stages.
As the Supreme Court has not yet indicated the scope of these interests, it is impossible to determine whether New Jersey's pretrial right
of access is based upon "adequate and independent" state grounds. 7 °

television accounts: that the information disseminated will be prejudicial, and that
the prejudicial information w\ill infect or influence the minds of the jurors to such an
extent that they will be unable to render a fair and just verdict based solely upon
evidence offered during the trial.
Id.
See id.
165Id.
166 Williams, 93 N.J. at 51-52 & n.3, 459 A.2d at 647 & n.3. Only Justice Powell had
recognized a pretrial right of access under the first amendment, see Gannett. 443 U.S. at 397
(Powell, J., concurring), while Chief Justice Burger expressly rejected any notion of a pretrial
right of access. Id. at 394-97.
167 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
168 Williams, 93 N.J. at 69-70 n.17, 459 A.2d at 657 n.17.
66o See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
170 See Comment, supra note 142, at 1411-12.
14

The federal Constitution also imposes significant ceilings. The sixth amendment
right to a fair trial, for example, may constrain an attempt to increase access to
pretrial proceedings. Such access might impair a defendant's rights if the press
published damaging information before a jury could be sequestered. For this reason,
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The Williams majority wanted to provide guidance for lower
courts in evaluating closure applications. Thus, a definitive standard
was essential. Since the United States Supreme Court had not promulgated a definitive standard for balancing the competing interests of
fairness and openness,'17' the Williams majority decided to enunciate a
standard in accordance with the New Jersey Constitution. Significantly, the majority did not adopt any of the balancing tests which
previously had been proposed by the various courts and commentators. All of these tests would require a defendant to make some showing of a possibility of prejudice, but the differences are more than a
matter of semantics. One test would have required a defendant to
show that an open proceeding would pose a "reasonable likelihood" of
172
danger to his fair trial guarantee before closure could be ordered.
Another test would have required the defendant to show that there
would be a "substantial probability" of juror bias because of the open
proceeding.173 A third test would have required the defendant to show
that an open proceeding presented a "clear and present danger" to his
right to a fair trial. 7 4 The New Jersey Supreme Court instead required

some state courts have cited the federal Constitution as a bar to expansive interpretations of state constitutional press rights.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
If the United States Supreme Court finds that there is a pretrial right of access under the
Federal Constitution, then New Jersey's pretrial right of access is constitutionally permissible. If,
however, the United States Supreme Court finds that there is no pretrial right of access under the
Federal Constitution, then New Jersey's pretrial right of access must be analyzed to determine
whether it is based on "adequate and independent" state grounds. If the New Jersey courts could
adequately protect a defendant's sixth amendment interest while allowing a pretrial right of
access under the state constitution, then New Jersey's pretrial right of access presumably would
be based on "adequate and independent" state grounds.
.. The "compelling governmental interest" standard enunciated in Globe Newspaper, 457
U.S. at 606-07, and repeated in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 52 U.S.L.W. 4113,
4115-16 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1984), only indicates that some showing must be made before closure can
be ordered. It does not indicate what measure of prejudice must be shown by the party seeking
closure before a "'compelling governmental interest" has been demonstrated.
172 Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 91 F.R.D. 289 (Prelim. Draft 1981). Proposed Rule 43.1 (b) (1) would allow closure upon a showing "that there is a
reasonable likelihood that dissemination of information from the proceeding would interfere
with the defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury." Id. at 365-66 (emphasis added).
This standard is similar to that apparently endorsed by the Gannett majority, a "reasonable
probability" test. Cf. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 393.
113 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
'7

II

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL

JUSTICE 8-3.2, at 8.35 commentary (2d ed. 1980). This was the standard which was sought in

Koedatich (the companion case to Williams) by intervenor Newark Morning Ledger Company,
Publisher of the Star-Ledger. Brief of Newark Morning Ledger Company, Publisher of the StarLedger at 36-38, State v. Koedatich, 93 N.J. 39 (1983).
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a defendant to show clearly that the open proceeding would produce a
"realistic likelihood" of prejudice. The operative words in each
of
these tests would require a defendant to meet a different burden, but
it is impossible to assess quantitatively the difference between each
test. The precise wording of these tests is unimportant. Rather, what
is most significant is the fact that each test applies a presumption of
openness which a defendant must rebut. It is the strength of this
presumption which determines how far a defendant must go before
the presumption has been rebutted. Requiring a defendant to show
clearly that an open proceeding poses a "realistic likelihood" of juror
bias represents a strong presumption in favor of open proceedings.
This presumption of openness in the balancing process favors first
amendment interests, but it is not based on the preferred status of the
first amendment. 7 5 Rather, it is based on common sense and logic. A
closed courtroom presents a direct infringement on first amendment
rights while an open courtroom rarely presents a threat to a criminal
defendant's sixth amendment rights. It is unwise to subordinate the
first amendment to the sixth amendment on the basis of a highly
speculative assertion of juror bias. While first amendment interests
always are present in a decision to close a judicial proceeding, such is
not the case with sixth amendment rights. A defendant first must
demonstrate that his sixth amendment rights are in jeopardy before
any balancing test may be invoked. While the "realistic likelihood"
standard of Williams is by no means the definitive standard, it does
represent a strong presumption in favor of the first amendment which
is essential to the analysis.
This presumption in favor of the first amendment also affects the
burden of proof as to the availability of alternatives to closure. There
has been a split of authority as to whether the defendant should have
to show the unavailability of alternatives to closure, or whether the

"I While the first amendment has been found to enjoy a preferred status in the scheme of
constitutional liberties, see, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943), it should
enjoy no such status when balanced against a criminal defendant's sixth amendment rights.
The authors of the Bill of Rights did not undertake to assign priorities as between
First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights, ranking one as superior to the
other. . . . [I]f the authors of these guarantees, fully aware of the potential conflicts
between them, were unwilling or unable to resolve the issue by assigning to one
priority over the other, it is not for us to rewrite the Constitution by undertaking
what they declined to do.
Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 561 (Burger, C.J.). But see Richmond Nettspapers, 448 U.S. at 563
(Chief Justice Burger curiously referring to defendant's superior sixth amendment right in closure
cases).
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public and press should demonstrate affirmatively the availability of
such alternatives.1 71 Since competing interests are at stake once the
defendant has demonstrated a threat of prejudice, the first and sixth
amendment interests should be allowed to coexist whenever possible.
Simply showing a threat of prejudice does not make closure presumptively valid. 77 Closure of the court is a drastic measure which should
not to be utilized unless it is the only available alternative. The defendant, as the moving party, should show that all other alternatives
would be ineffective or the trial court should determine the same
before closure can be ordered. The Williams court chose the latter
course.

78

The standards adopted by the Williams majority were based on a
"confluence" of federal and state constitutional guarantees, 79 but
these standards cannot rest on "adequate and independent" state
grounds. Closure presents a constitutional conflict between a defendant's rights and the rights of the public and of the press. In balancing
these constitutional guarantees, a trial court must assess the weight to
be given to each constitutional interest. Viewed from this perspective,
closure may be considered a sliding scale with the first and sixth
amendments at opposite ends. Any standard adopted by a court represents a mark upon this sliding scale which, when met, will justify
closure of the court. Where this mark will be made on the scale
depends on the strength of the presumption in favor of the first
amendment. Obviously, any movement toward one end of the scale
operates as a movement away from the opposite end. As there are
federal as well as state interests at either end of the spectrum, the
supremacy clause dictates that only federal movement is permissible.
Any movement by the states has the potential of affecting federal
rights at either end of the scale. While states may expand their own
constitutional guarantees, they may not accomplish this result at the

"I Compare Gannett, 443 U.S. at 442-43 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (placing burden on
defendant to show unavailability of alternatives) with Williams, 93 N.J. at 79. 459 A.2d at 662
(Schreiber, J., dissenting) (placing burden on those objecting to closure to show availability of
alternatives to closure).
'71 See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 52 U.S.L.W. 4113, 4116
(U.S. Jan.18,
1984) ("Absent consideration of alternatives to closure, the trial court could not constitutionally
close the voir dire."). But see Comment, supra note 149, at 540 (stating that even when
alternatives would be ineffective, closure would be improper and defendant would have to be
acquitted).
178 Williams, 93 N.J. at 66,
459 A.2d at 655.
7 Id. at 51, 459 A.2d at 647.

NOTE S

1984]

expense of federally guaranteed rights.8
sure cases.

0

This is equally true in clo-

181

When a state resorts to its state constitution in a closure case, it
extends dual rights to each of the parties. Thus, in Williams the
defendant had both federal 8 and state'8 3 guarantees of a fair trial by
an impartial jury. Conversely, the press had both federal 184 and
state 185 guarantees of a right of access. When it adopted the "realistic
likelihood" test in Williams, the New Jersey Supreme Court not only
balanced the conflicting state constitutional guarantees, but also impliedly attributed the same weight to each of their federal counterparts. If a "realistic likelihood of prejudice" is required to overcome
the presumption of openness for judicial proceedings in New Jersey, a
defendant's sixth amendment rights obviously are implicated. The
court's balancing test in State v. Williams thus has the potential of
reducing a criminal defendant's rights guaranteed under the Federal
Constitution. 186 If the United States Supreme Court adopts a different
standard than did the court in Williams, then the "realistic likelihood"
8 7
test must be modified.1

850

See supra note 145 and accompanying text.

181 See supra note 170.
..2 U.S. CONST. amend. VIL see Williams, 93 N.J. at 60-62, 459 A.2d at 652-53.
1
N.J. CONST. art. 1, para. 10; see Williams, 93 N.J. at 60-62, 459 A.2d at 652-53.
114 Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 596: Richmond Newspapers. 448 U.S. at 575-76.

185N.J. CONST. art. 1, para. 6: see Williams, 93 N.J. at 58-59, 459 A.2d at 650-51.
1811See supra note 170. Since the Supreme Court has not enunciated a definitive standard for
evaluating closure applications, it is impossible to determine the weight which must be given to a
criminal defendant's sixth amendment rights in balancing the conflicting interests in a closure
application. The balancing process is confused further by the fact that the Supreme Court has
never extended the first amendment to include pretrial hearings. Until the Court addresses these
issues, it is impossible to evaluate the Williams "realistic likelihood" test under federal constitutional standards.
187 The majority "acknowledge[d] the possibility that the federal constitution will be interpreted in a manner more restrictive of the right of access to pretrial criminal proceedings than
that required by our State Constitution and our interpretation of the federal constitution."
Williams, 93 N.J. at 71 n.19, 459 A.2d at 658 n.19. The majority hinted, however, that such
circumstances might not demand that the "realistic likelihood" test would have to be abandoned.
If this eventuality should arise, we do not believe that the balancing test and the
standards designed to implement that test as announced in this opinion would be
imperiled. To the extent that our own Constitution accords a more expansive right of
access to pretrial hearings than may eventually be determined by the Supreme
Court, we are confident that the defendant's countervailing right to a fair trial can
still be preserved and will remain uncompromised. Cf. PruneYard Shopping Center
v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (state's more expansive right of public access to private
shopping center not violative of taking clause of Fifth Amendment or due process
clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
Id. at 71 n.19, 459 A.2d at 658 n.19.
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The Williams decision points out the need for further guidance in
this area. Hopefully, the United States Supreme Court soon will resolve the ambiguities surrounding closure-specifically, the appropriate standard, its applicability to pretrial proceedings, and the propriety of using state constitutional rights in the balancing process. While
the decision in State v. Williams was based on sound logic and reasoning, it does not represent the final word on the subject for the New
Jersey courts. Although the New Jersey Supreme Court tried to base
its decision on "adequate and independent" state grounds, it clearly
did not. A state decision cannot be "adequate" in the area of closure,
much less "independent," until the United States Supreme Court indicates the minimum guarantees of the Federal Constitution. Until that
time, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in State v.
Williams and State v. Koedatich represents an intelligent response to
the problem.
Timothy M. Donohue

The Williams majority's apparent reliance upon PruneYard is misplaced. Obviously Prune
Yard did not give state courts the power to narrow the scope of rights guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution. PruneYard merely allowed the states to define "'property rights" in the first
instance under the fifth amendment. See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 94
(1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 84.
The Williams majority apparently recognized the fact that the enunciation of federal
standards by the United States Supreme Court might require abandonment of the -realistic
likelihood" test.
If, contrary to our expectation, experience indicates that the rights of defendants to a
fair trial by an impartial jury are not sufficiently protected by the test that we have
adopted today, the test may, of course, be modified by this Court in order to provide
for a more satisfactory balance between the constitutional concerns of openness and
fairness.
Williams, 93 N.J. at 72 n.19, 459 A.2d at 658 n.19.

